, argue that the equilibrium solution to a quantum game isn't unique but is already present in the classical game itself. In this work, we debunk this assertion by showing that a random strategy in a particular quantum (Hawk-Dove) game is unique to the quantum game. In other words the equilibrium solution of the quantum Hawk-Dove game can not be obtained in the classical Hawk-Dove game. Moreover, we provide an analytical solution to the quantum 2 × 2 strategic form Hawk-Dove game using random mixed strategies. The random strategies which we describe are evolutionary stable implying both Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium with their payoff's classically unobtainable. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Mathematicians have been interested in parlor games since the time of Plato. It was Euler who started the new field of graph theory with a game theoretic notion-what would be the smallest path through the seven rivers of Konigsberg [1] . However, it was left to John von Neumann to put parlor games in mathematical language under the guise of game theory [2] . Game theory when it started out was a remarkable concept which enabled economists, social scientists, statistical physicists to propose game theoretic solutions to economic, social and statistical physics problems [3] [4] [5] . Although, quantum theory was ante-natal to game theory, quantum physicists were late in employing game theoretic techniques in quantum problems. It was not until quantum information theory came into being that quantum game theoretic problems came in to vogue [1, 7] . However, a rude blow was struck on quantum game theory by the work of van Enk and Pike [2] who purported to show that quantum games do not have anything extra to offer than classical games, albeit with the caveat that they might have a relevance to quantum algorithms. This work led to an embargo in certain journals [9] regarding game theory papers. van Enk and Pike's argument is on the basis of the Prisoner's dilemma both the classical and the quantum version [1] . Our aim in this work is to provide an alternative to van Enk-Pike's case study on Prisoner's dilemma. We show that van Enk-Pike's assertion is incorrect and also not universal, in fact we provide an alternative game-the quantum Hawk-Dove game which not only gives a better solution than the classical equivalent but it's essence can never be captured by the latter too.
This paper is organized as follows-section II reviews the concept of quantum games, where we briefly describe Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality using Prisoner's dilemma as an example. We elucidate the van Enk-Pike's criterion and the motivation behind this work in subsequent subsections. Section III introduces and solves the quantum Hawk-Dove game and we show how a random strategy in a quantum Hawk-Dove game gives an equilibrium solution which cannot be replicated in the classical Hawk-Dove game unlike the case of quantum Prisoner's dilemma based on which van Enk-Pike assert that the equilibrium solution of quantum games can be found in the classical game itself. This is followed in section IV with a brief discussion on our results and finally in the supplementary material we implement the random strategy on quantum Prisoner's dilemma where it is shown that although we do not get a better solution than what is classically possible, herein too the assertion of van Enk-Pike that the essence of quantized prisoner's dilemma is contained in the original classical game is violated.
II. QUANTUM GAMES
According to Eisert, et. al., any situation[1] wherein a quantum system steered by two or more parties, results in the quantification of utilities, can be formulated as a quantum game. In general, a game G in the strategic form is a triplet[3]-
in Eq. (1), N = {1, 2, ..., k} defines a finite set of players, S i is the set of strategies of player i, for every player i ∈ N and u i : S 1 × S 2 × ... × S k → R (R is the real space) is a function associating each vector of strategies s = (s i ) i∈N with the payoff u i (s) of player i, for every player i ∈ N . For a two player strategic game, it is convenient to write Eq. (1) in bimatrix form-
In Eq.
(2), s m l represents strategy profile with l ∈ {1, 2} being the player's profile and m ∈ {1, 2} the strategy for each player. A pair (a ij , b ij ) ∈ R 2 represents the payoffs for the player 1 and 2, respectively. A two player quantum game (T ) can be enumerated as T = {H, ρ, S A , S B , P A , P B }, with H describing the Hilbert space of the physical system, ρ the initial state and the sets S A and S B are the permissible quantum operations of the two players. P A and P B are the utility functionals or payoff operators which specify the utility for each player and operations s A ∈ S A , s B ∈ S B are the strategies for each player.
A. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality
One of the most widely used methods for predicting the outcome of a strategic-form game is Nash equilibrium [3, 10] . It is a strategy profile from which no player has a profitable deviation. A strategy vector s * = (s * 1 , s * 2 , · · · , s * n ) is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N and each strategy s i ∈ S i the following is satisfied:
Nash equilibrium exists when each player's strategy is his/her best response to the predicted strategies of opponents. When such a equilibrium exists, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from it. The idea of Nash equilibrium is also intimately connected to the concept of Pareto optimality. If two or more players follow strategies to the extent that no other combination of strategies can increase at least one person's payoff without reducing the payoffs of others, then the outcome is Pareto optimal. In other words, an outcome is Pareto optimal if no other outcome can help some players without adversely affecting others. But in many cases, it is not guaranteed that a Nash Equilibrium is also Pareto optimal. The most famous example where Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality differ is Prisoners dilemma.
Prisoner's Dilemma
In the traditional version of the Prisoner's dilemma, the police have arrested two suspects (Alice and Bob) and are interrogating them in separate rooms. Each has two choices: (i) to cooperate with each other and not confess the crime (C), and (ii) to defect to the police and confess the crime (D). Payoff matrix for this game reads:
The values in the above table can be explained as follows-3 means 1 year in jail while 1 means 10 years in jail. 0 represents a life sentence while 5 implies no jail time. No matter what the other suspect does, each can improve his own position by defecting to the police. If the other defects, then one better do the same to avoid harsh punishment (0 payoff or life sentence). If the other cooperates, then one can obtain the favorable treatment accorded a state's witness by defecting to the police (a payoff of 5 implying no jail term). Thus, defecting is the dominant strategy for each. But when both defect, the outcome is worse for both than when they both cooperate. Thus cooperate, i.e., (C, C) is a Pareto optimal strategy. The aforesaid is the description of pure strategies in classical Prisoner's dilemma.
Lets find out what happens if both play a mixed strategy. lets consider a repeated play of the game in which p and q are the probabilities with which C is played by Alice and Bob, respectively. The strategy D is then played with probability (1 − p) by Alice, and with probability (1 − q) by Bob, and the players' payoff relations read
The strategic pair (p * , q * ) is Nash equilibrium when
For the payoff matrix (4) these inequalities generates a strategic pair (p * , q * ) = (0, 0) i.e, (D, D) is the Nash equilibrium for mixed strategies too [3, 10] .
B. van Enk-Pike's criterion S. J. van Enk and R. Pike in [2] compare quantum games to classical games as regards their utility to quantum information processing. Firstly, they question the extent to which the solution of a quantum game is available in the underlying classical game itself. They argue that in a quantum game scenario, even though the quantum game does not solve the underlying classical game, the equilibrium quantum solution already exists in the original classical game. Secondly, they argue that introduction of an entangled state allows players to make use of correlations present in such a state. Hence, violating the spirit of non cooperative games.
In order to illustrate this, they consider a two-player Prisoner's dilemma game between Alice and Bob denoted by the payoff matrix (4). The dilemma is that, (D, D) is the dominant equilibrium or Nash equilibrium, but both players would prefer (C, C), i.e., it is Pareto optimal. The general quantization procedure as suggested in [1] would yield a quantum payoff table:
where, Q, is a quantum strategy defined as Q = iZ and played on a quantum game with a maximally entangled state. (Q, Q) is the solution to the quantum Prisoner's dilemma game wherein C = I and D = X. According to the van Enk-Pike criterion, the quantum solution obtained by considering the quantum strategies over an entangled state is not unique but is also possible in the classical game. This can be seen from the payoff of (3, 3) for the (C, C) strategies. Thus the equilibrium solution obtained in the quantum game can also be secured in the classical game. Not only this one can also see (C, Q)&(D, D), (D, Q)&(C, D) and (Q, D)&(D, C) yield exactly identical payoff's. Thus, they conclude that the essence of quantized prisoner's dilemma is captured completely by the classical prisoner's dilemma game.
C. Motivation
We would like to challenge this assertion of van Enk-Pike, especially the fact that equilibrium solution of quantum games is present in the original classical game itself. This is substantiated by playing a completely random strategy over an entangled quantum state using two-player Hawk Dove game as an example, delineated in the next section. We show that playing a random strategy over a maximally entangled state yields a solution which is not possible in the original classical game. The main take home message of our work is elucidated in payoff table (22) . In this way, we negate van Enk-Pike's assertion that solutions to quantum games are available in the classical game itself. In our case quantum game-"playing random strategies in the non locally entangled game of Hawk-Dove" cannot be replicated nor its essence captured in the classical Hawk-Dove game.
Secondly, van Enk-Pike's comment regarding non-local correlations violating the spirit of a non-cooperative game is fallacious. There is no stopping classical correlation being present in the classical Prisoner's dilemma game. The two prisoners could be two brothers or husband-wife but that does not change the definition of the classical Prisoner's dilemma game. In the quantum version too the process of introduction of quantum entanglement does not change the game. The two parties are not aware of the fact that the entangled state is distributed between them. The introduction of entanglement induces correlations non locally. Finally, van Enk-Pike make a comment comparing the solution of the factorization problem via quantum Shor's algorithm to quantum game theory. In their own words-"no classical solution for the game of efficiently factoring large numbers is known, so quantum mechanics provides a truly novel solution." We completely debunk this argument via our example of playing random strategies in the quantum Hawk-Dove game and show that it does indeed provide an unique equilibrium solution which is absent from the classical game. In the next section, we solve the quantum Hawk-Dove game in detail which is followed by a discussion.
III. QUANTUM HAWK-DOVE GAME
In our work we negate van Enk-Pike's assertion on quantum games by showing that a completely random strategy can solve the quantum game by yielding a better and an unique equilibrium solution when being operated over a maximally entangled state. In order to show that, we consider a two player strategic form Hawk-Dove game with complete information [3] . Hawks are aggressive and always fight to take possession of a resource. These fights are brutal and the loser is one who first sustains the injury. The winner takes sole possession of the resource. However, Doves never fight for the resource, displaying patience and if attacked immediately withdraw to avoid injury. Thus, Doves will always lose a conflict against Hawk but without sustaining any injury. In case, two Doves face each other there will be a period of displaying patience with some cost (time or energy for display) to both but without any injury. It is assumed that both the Doves are equally good in displaying and waiting for random time. In a Dove-Dove contest, both have equal probability of winning. The winner would be the one with more patience. The classical payoff matrix is represented as follows:
where v and i are the value of resource and cost of injury, respectively. The cost of displaying patience and waiting is d. Let v = 50, i = 100 and d = 10. The reason for taking these particular values is because when both players choose Hawk they will suffer a loss in the form of injury. The injury reduces the player's ability to gain the resource in the future. Thus, the injury tends to preclude gain in the future and is therefore taken to be large. On the other hand, the cost of displaying patience is kept purposely low, and in general, less than the cost of the resource. This is because one can retreat when the other chooses to be a Hawk [11] . For the aforesaid set of values the payoff table when both Alice and Bob pursue pure strategies is given as- 
Nash equilibrium for the classical Hawk-Dove game is (D, D) which is also Pareto optimal. To introduce the quantum version of Hawk-Dove game we follow Marinatto and Weber's scheme [12] . This scheme has been extended to include various forms of Hawk-Dove game with initially entangled states in Refs. [13] [14] [15] . The initial state ρ in is taken to be a maximally entangled state, ρ in = |ψ ψ| with
The two entangled qubits are then forwarded to Alice and Bob respectively who perform unitary operation on the initial state to get-
U describes a general strategy represented by a 2 × 2 unitary matrix parametrized by two parameters θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2], and is given as
The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are defined as
The payoff functions for Alice and Bob are the mean values of the above operators, i.e., $ = T r(P ρ f ). The expected payoff for either Alice or Bob reads:
The strategy corresponding to Hawk(H) is represented by identity matrix (I) and that corresponding to Dove(D) is X, the NOT operator, i.e., X|0 = |1 , X|1 = |0 Now, lets consider the strategy represented as "Q" as defined in[1]:
The solution to the game using this strategy is presented in the payoff 
From the payoff table (17) it turns out that the previous Nash equilibrium (D, D) is no longer the sole equilibrium solution, as both players can shuttle between "D" and "Q". The fact that P A (Q, Q) = P B (Q, Q) = (15, 15), implies that it is Pareto optimal too, but it does not give a better solution than the classical game. However, herein too as can be seen the intrinsice nature of playing quantum Hawk-Dove with quantum strategies means its essence is again captured in the classical Hawk-Dove game. (Q, Q) and (D, D) yield identical payoff's so as (H, D) and (D, Q), (D, H) and (Q, D). We now establish that using a random mixed strategy on a maximally entangled state in a quantum game scenario yields a solution and payoff's which cannot be replicated in the classical Hawk-Dove game. Let |ψ in be a maximally entangled state represented by-
If Alice plays Hawk(I), with probability p and Dove(X) with probability (1 − p) and Bob uses these operators with probability q and (1 − q), respectively, then the final density matrix of the bipartite system takes the form:
The expected payoff functions for both players are obtained as:
Corresponding to the set of values in payoff table Eq. (9), these set of payoff functions become:
The payoff $(p, q) is plotted as a function of p and q in Fig. (1a) . The maximum value attained by the payoff function $(p, q) is 25, ironically for (p, q) = (0, 1) or (H, D) and (p, q) = (1, 0) or (D, H), which is a pure strategy on an entangled quantum state. The payoff table in the larger strategic space which includes pure and mixed random strategies is as follows- It is clear from the payoff table Eq. (22) and Fig. (1) that using a completely random strategy which is a mixture of pure strategies H and D we can not only get a better and unique solution, beyond what is possible in the classical game. The payoff's from using random strategies ′ R ′ can never be replicated in a classical game unlike the payoff's obtained by using ′ Q ′ .
Bob
In Fig. 1(b) , we show that for 0.66 < p < 1 and 0 < q < 0.34 the payoffs are greater than what is classically achievable. In other words, there is a restriction on the probability with which a player can play a pure strategy on a maximally entangled state, in order to gain a better payoff than a classical game. It is important to notice here that the random strategies are evolutionary stable strategies too which in turn implies that they are both Nash equilibrium as well as Pareto optimal. Although, random strategies work in quantum Hawk-Dove game and give better payoff's, this is by no means universal. In the quantum Prisoner's dilemma game even random strategies do not yield better payoff's than the classical Prisoner's dilemma game. However, our point of contention that the essence of quantum game can never be replicated in classical game holds true for prisoner's dilemma also. This is shown in the supplementary material.
IV. DISCUSSION
This paper explores the idea of better equilibrium strategies in quantum games. In detail, we investigate the quantum Hawk-Dove game using the density matrix formalism[1] in order to violate the van Enk-Pike's assertion that equilibrium solutions to a quantum game are not unique and can be obtained in the underlying classical game itself. We define a random strategy "R", and the restriction on the probability with which one can play this in order to get an unique equilibrium solution of the quantum game which cannot be replicated in the classical game. Thus, the essence of a quantum game can never be completely captured by the original classical game.
The emphasis of this work was on examining how a random strategy applied in the context of quantum Hawk-Dove game provides a better and unique solution than what is possible in the classical equivalent. Our work leads us to conclude that we can indeed get better and exclusive solution to quantum games which aren't possible classically by using proper strategies negating the conclusions of van Enk-Pike. Strategies control the outcome of any game. We have to choose the strategies properly in order to get the best solution to a particular game. We hope our results may enable everyone to better understand the structure of quantum games and its application in quantum information theory. 
Where "C" and "D" represent the strategies corresponding to pure Confess(C) and Defect(D). Consider a quantum strategy represented as "Q", defined in [1] as-
The solution to the game for this strategy is given below-Bob C D Q C (3,3) (0,5) (1,1) Alice D (5,0) (1,1) (0,5) Q (1,1) (5,0) (3,3)
This is the result as obtained by van Enk-Pike in [2] . Now let |ψ in be a maximally entangled state represented by:
If Alice uses I, the identity operator, with probability p and X with probability (1 − p) and Bob uses these operators with probability q and (1 − q), respectively. Then the final density matrix of the bipartite system takes the form:
Here ρ in = |ψ in ψ in |. The payoff operators for Alice and Bob are defined as
The payoff functions for Alice and Bob are the mean values of the above operators, i.e., $ A (p, q) = T r(P A ρ f ) and $ B (p, q) = T r(P B ρ f )
The expected payoff functions for both the players are obtained as:
$ A (p, q) = $ A (p, q) = $(p, q) = 1 2 (4 − 2pq + p + q)
plotting $(p, q) as a function of p and q in Figure 2 , we see that the payoffs are always less than that attained in classical PD as also exemplified in Eq. (31) FIG. 2: 3D plot of payoff function $(p, q) as a function of probabilities p and q for Prisoner's Dilemma. The maximum value obtained by this curve is 2.5 for (p, q) = (0, 1) and (1, 0).
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The maximum value attained by the payoff function $(p, q) is 2.5. Quantum payoff table is:
Bob C D Q R C (3,3) (0,5) (1,1) (2.5,2.5) Alice D (5,0)
(1,1) (0,5) (2.5,2.5) Q (1,1) (5,0) (3,3) (2.5,2.5) R (2.5,2.5) (2.5,2.5) (2.5,2.5) (2.5,2.5) (31) Playing pure strategies over an entangled state gives maximum payoff of 2.5, although this is less than what is classically or quantumly achieved one has to again note that the payoff's for the random strategies played on an entangled state cannot be replicated in the original classical game. Thus negating van Enk-Pike's assertion in the quantized prisoner's dilemma too.
